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REAL PROPERTY-MORTGAGES-LIABILITY OF MORTGAGEE OF LESSEE'S
TERM FOR RENT-Respondent leased a building to South Texas Kitchens,
Inc., for a term of five years. The lessee became indebted to petitioner and,
being unable to meet this obligation, transferred its business assets and
lease to petitioner as security.1 Petitioner was authorized to manage the
business and to apply all proceeds to discharge the indebtedness, the transfer to terminate when the debt was fully paid. Petitioner went into possession of the premises and operated the business for about six months, paying the rent during that period. It then vacated the property and ceased
making rental payments. Respondent sued petitioner and the lessee in an
action for rent and recovered a judgment against both. On appeal by
petitioner only, held, reversed. A mortgage is only a security device and does
not vest all of the mortgagor's title and estate in the mortgagee. A mortgagee
in possession2 of the mortgaged premises is not an assignee of .the lease and
thus is not liable on the covenant of rent. Amco Trust, Inc. v. Naylor, (Tex.
1958) 317 S.W. (2d) 47.
An assignee of a lease is liable on covenants running with the lease3
while a sub-lessee is not. The execution of the lease places the lessee in
privity of estate with the lessor.4 A .transfer by the lessee of his entire interest
in the lease terminates his privity of estate and creates privity of estate be•
tween the lessor and the transferee,5 the latter becoming an assignee. On
the other hand, where the transfer leaves the lessee with a reversion,s or in
some jurisdictions with a right of re-entry,7 the transferee is a sub-lessee
rather than an assignee

The court assumed that this was a mortgage.
See note 12 infra.
3 As a general rule, for a covenant to run there must be privity of estate between
covenantor and covenantee, and the benefit and the burden of the covenant .must "touch
and concern" the respective estates of the covenantor and the covenantee. Spencer's Case,
5 Coke 16, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (1583).
4 See TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §121 (1939).
5 Washington Natural Gas Co. v. Johnson, 123 Pa. 576, 16 A. 799 (1889). See TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §121 (1939).
6 Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., 129 Ill. 318, 21 N.E. 920 (1889).
7 Davis v. Vidal, 105 Tex. 444, 151 S.W. 290 (1912). ·Toe great weight of authority is
to the contrary. See Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., note 6 supra; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY,
3d ed., §123 (1939).
1
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There are two basic theories as to the nature of a mortgage; the title
theory and the lien theory. In the former, the mortgage is an absolute conveyance and the mortgagor has no right to possession unless the mortgage, or quite commonly a statute, provides for retention of possession.
In lien states, a mortgage is merely a security device, legal title being
retained by the mortgagor until foreclosure and sale. Where the title
theory is followed the mortgagee of the term is an assignee whether or
not he enters into possession, as long as he has the right to do so.8
Though it has been argued that since the mortgagor has a right to a reconveyance upon discharge of the debt he retains an interest in the transferred lease,9 this has been rejected on the ground that the mortgage, where
no right of possession has been reserved, or the mortgage plus default where
such a right has been reserved, is a conveyance of the lessee's entire interest
and creates privity of estate.1° On the other hand, among the states which
follow the lien theory of mortgages and have litigated the issue, there is a
split of authority. One view, originating in New York,11 is that a mortgagee
of the term who enters into possession of the mortgaged premises12 thereby
acquires the entire interest of the mortgagor and becomes an assignee.ta
The reasoning is that once the mortgagee has taken possession he is entitled to all the benefits of the lease and should therefore be subjected to
all the burdens. The other view, originating in California,14 is that the
mere acquisition of possession by the mortgagee does not vest him with the
entire interest of the mortgagor and that therefore he is not liable for rent
under the lease.15 In the principal case, the court rejected a prior Texas
8 Williams v. Bosanquet, 1 Brod. &: B. 238, 129 Eng. Rep. 714 (1819), rejecting Eaton
v. Jacques, 2 Doug. 455, 99 Eng. Rep. 290 (1780); Williams v. Safe Deposit&: Trust Co., 167
Md. 499, 175 A. 331 (1934).
9 See note 7 supra. A court using the title theory but adhering to this view would
logically have to reach the result of the principal case, since there would be no privity of
estate. See principal case at 51.
10 Williams v. Bosanquet, note 8 supra. Cf. Williams v. Safe Deposit &: Trust Co.,
note 8 supra.
11 Astor v. Hoyt, 5 Wend. (N.Y.) 603 (1830).
12 It is not at all clear from the cases when a mortgagee will be considered as being
in possession. Clearly, physical possession is sufficient and the giving of a lease by the
mortgagee seems to be enough. See Studebaker Corp. v. Aetna Savings &: Trust Co., (7th
Cir. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 385. Cf. Johnson v. Sherman, 15 Cal. 287 (1860). Although there are
no cases in point, it appears that the mere right to enter into possession is not sufficient.
It might be otherwise where possession had actually been taken and then abandoned, the
right to re-enter being retained. See Walton v. Cronly's Administrator, 14 Wend. (N.Y.)
63 (1835).
13 Astor v. Hoyt, note 11 supra; Olcese v. Val Blatz Brewing Co., 114 III. App. 597
(1908). But see David Bradley &: Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 99 Ill. App. 427 (1902); Studebaker Corp. v. Aetna Savings &: Trust Co., note 12 supra. Cf. McKee v. Angelrodt, 16 Mo.
283 (1852); Walton v. Cronly's Administrator, note 12 supra.
14 Johnson v. Sherman, note 12 supra.
15 Johnson v. Sherman, note 12 supra; Slane v. Polar Oil Co., 48 Wyo. 28, 41 P. (2d)
490 (1935). Cf. Detroit Trust Co. v. Mortensen, 273 Mich. 407, 263 N.W. 409 (1935);
Johnson v. Commercial State Bank, 142 Neb. 752, 7 N.W. (2d) 654 (1943). Se also 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §9.6, 361 (1952) (adopting the California view).
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decision16 which had followed the New York view, and instead adopted the
reasoning of California. It would seem difficult to support the New York
view since it is clear that the mortgagee, even though in possession, lacks
legal title.17 Furthermore, the view that privity of estate, a rather technical doctrine, depends on such principles as equating burdens with benefits finds no support elsewhere. In addition, it is even doubtful that equitable principles require that a mortgage, coupled with possession of the
premises in the mortgagee, be considered an assignment of the mortgagor's
entire interest. The lessor has relied on the credit of the lessee and has
an action against him for the rent.18 The position of the mortgagee in
possession is not analogous to that of an assignee. An assignee has the same
rights as to retention of profits as were enjoyed by the lessee, while the
mortgagee must apply all the proceeds of the business to the discharge of
the debt and does not therefore enjoy the independent status of an assignee.19 Moreover, when operation of the business proves fruitless and is
abandoned, it seems especially harsh to burden the mortgagee further with
the rent obligation. Thus whether the question is determined on the basis
of traditional legal logic or the balancing of equities the California view
appears to be the better solution.20 The mortgagee should be recognized
for what he really is, a security holder who does not in any real sense take the
place of the lessee.
Michael B. Lewiston, S.Ed.

16 Cockrell v. Houston Packing Co., 105
17 Slaughter v. Bemads, 97 Wis. 184, 72

Tex. 283, 147 S.W. 1145 (1912).
N.W. 977 (1897). Cf. Trimm v. Marsh, 54
N.Y. 599 (1874); Hewen Co. v. Thibaut Realty Co., 154 Misc. 687, 277 N.Y. S. 860 (1935).
18 This is true even where there has been an assignment. Wall v. Hinds, 4 Gray
(Mass.) 256 (1855).
19 Cf. Cargill v. Thompson, 57 Minn. 534, 59 N.W. 638 (1894).
20 The California view has recently been adopted by several other jurisdictions considering the question for the first time. Slane v. Polar Oil Co., note 15 supra. Cf. Detroit
Trust Co. v. Mortensen, note 15 supra; Johnson v. Commercial State Bank, note 15 supra;
Hausman &: Sons, Inc. v. Central Home Trust Co., ll8 N.J.L. 104, 191 A. 301 (1937).

